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Abstract
Background: Little is known about the reasoning mechanisms used by physicians in decision-making and how this
compares to diagnostic clinical practice guidelines. We explored the clinical reasoning process in a real life environment.
Method: This is a qualitative study evaluating transcriptions of sixteen physicians’ reasoning during appointments with
patients, clinical discussions between specialists, and personal interviews with physicians affiliated to a hospital in Brazil.
Results: Four main themes were identified: simple and robust heuristics, extensive use of social environment rationality,
attempts to prove diagnostic and therapeutic hypothesis while refuting potential contradictions using positive test strategy,
and reaching the saturation point. Physicians constantly attempted to prove their initial hypothesis while trying to refute
any contradictions. While social environment rationality was the main factor in the determination of all steps of the clinical
reasoning process, factors such as referral letters and number of contradictions associated with the initial hypothesis had
influence on physicians’ confidence and determination of the threshold to reach a final decision.
Discussion: Physicians rely on simple heuristics associated with environmental factors. This model allows for robustness,
simplicity, and cognitive energy saving. Since this model does not fit into current diagnostic clinical practice guidelines, we
make some propositions to help its integration.
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Introduction
Clinicians make numerous diagnostic decisions that affect
patient’s well-being and although most of the time these decisions
are correct, sometimes they can be fatal [1]. Clinicians are often
advised to base their decisions on clinical practice guidelines that
are informed by evidence-based medicine (EBM) [2]. However,
non-adherence to clinical practice guidelines is a perennial
problem extensively documented in literature [3–6]. While the
literature identifies multiple reasons for this failure like, differences
in practice settings, expectations and behavior of the patient, mode
of implementation, display of guidelines, we believe that the
central problem is a disconnect between the assumptions about
how clinical decisions are made and the actual practice of decision
making. Precisely stating, clinical decisions are assumed to be far
more rational and deductive than they actually are, which can lead
clinical practice guidelines to fall out of sync with clinician’s
decision realities. Despite having extensive literature in the field of
clinical decision-making, there remains a paucity of formal studies
to understand this decision making process.
Clinical practice guideline advocates consider that medical
decision making should be based on an explicit, quantitative and
systematic approach [7]. Conversely, literature on clinical
reasoning has demonstrated that clinicians are not able to follow
purely rational, highly formal and logical thinking due to inherent
limitations of human cognitive capacity that prevents storage, as
well as processing of multiple rules in short periods of time [8–9].
The use of diagnostic clinical practice guidelines (DCPGs) can
sometimes be challenging and may be with limited effectiveness,
mainly in cases of complex symptoms such as syncope [10,11,12]
or complex diagnosis such as disease syndromes having multiple
criteria. Decision trees used in DCPGs are often more focused on
accuracy than usability and their complexity may stop clinicians
from using them, even when there is evidence of their benefit [13].
In clinical environments, the risks and costs of making optimal
decisions are often far greater than those of satisfactory ones [14].
Thus, in addition to explicit quantitative data, clinicians also rely
on social environmental information (for example: depending on
how patients behave and what they expect) [5]. They also use an
adaptive approach that incorporates new information as it
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heuristics in clinical decision making wherein clinicians, like all
decision-makers, make the best decisions they can with the limited
information available [15–16].
Research on the widespread use of heuristics has typically
focused on how biases can lead to reasoning flaws, for example: if
you have already seen several cases of a disease you can have a
tendency to diagnose the same disease not taking into consider-
ation less usual diagnosis; another example is the collection of
more data than needed due to conservatism. These studies led to
erroneous conclusions, overlooking how successful, heuristic based
reasoning can be [17]. Although there have been studies
examining the use of heuristics in decision making, most of them
are not related to the clinical environment. The few which are
related to clinical decision making are laboratory experiments
based on surveys, questionnaires and interviews. In addition, these
studies present multiple theories that are highly debated. For
example, while there are theories proposing that the clinicians use
a deductive or elimination approach in making diagnostic
decisions, the bounded rationality theory emphasizes the impor-
tance of including environmental factors in clinical decision
making [18,19,20]. One of the few real world studies, published by
Bruyninckx et al (2009), demonstrated the importance of
environmental factors in the referral decision process. Natural
setting evaluation is important to fully understand clinical
decision making [21]. To our knowledge, there are few previous
studies evaluating the clinical reasoning process in the clinical
environment.
Thus, the aim of this qualitative study is to explore the clinical
reasoning process in a real practice environment in order to
understand how physicians make decisions in their daily practice
and relate these findings to DCPG implementation.
Methods
Subjects
Sixteen physicians gave written informed consent and agreed to
participate in this study. We conducted the study at Hospital
Angelina Caron, a medium-size hospital in Brazil which is a
referral center, performing wide range of complex, as well as
routine diagnostic and therapeutic procedures. The study was
approved by Hospital Angelina Caron’s Ethics Committee.
Sampling
A convenience sampling scheme called snowball sampling [22]
was used for selection of participants. Following this sampling
method, we did not use statistical sampling but rather guided
our sampling by the analysis performed after each interview
in that new findings guided the choice of other clinicians and
clinical situations that would confirm or reject a given theme.
Accordingly, we asked the participants of the study to
recommend to us their colleagues or friends, whom we could
approach to check their willingness and subsequent participation
in the study.
Data collection
Data was collected using voice recordings from three different
activities:
1. Regular clinical encounters between participating
physicians and patients. All clinical appointments were
voice recorded with prior written informed consent from
patient and physician. All these appointments were outpatient
and our research coordinators acted just as observers.
Additional notes were made about the office environment,
physician’s attitude during the appointment, such as expressions
of reflection or concern, and physician’s notes in the medical
chart that could provide additional insight about the clinical
reasoning process.
2. Clinical discussions between specialists. When further
insight was needed to address complex cases, physicians consulted
with colleagues in other specialties. These meetings occurred
frequently in the wards. When a physician made a comment about
the need for such a meeting, our research coordinator attempted
to attend this meeting whenever possible. If multiple discussions
occurred over time, every effort was made to attend all of them
and follow the case longitudinally until a final diagnostic or
therapeutic decision had been made. These encounters were also
voice recorded.
3. Personal interviews with participating physi-
cians. We conducted individual interviews with participating
physicians after analyzing the transcriptions for the physician-
patient and physician-physician discussions. All interviews
were conducted at the physician’s office. The interviews were
considered as a fundamental instrument to deepen understanding,
usually by obtaining clarifications about specific events that
happened during clinical interviews, asking for clarification on
thought processes occurring during the clinical encounter.
Transcription
In order to improve accuracy, all discussions were transcribed
verbatim by the research coordinator who collected the data
(APM) within seven days from data collection. Physician and
patient identifiers were removed from the transcript to ensure
confidentiality. Notes and impressions obtained during the
interview were added to the original transcription as comments.
Data analysis
In the analysis, we used a grounded theory approach to describe
occurrences as they pertained to the individual; without recourse
to previous theory, deductions, or assumptions from other
disciplines [23]. Prior to this study’s commencement, none of
the investigators had a preconceived hypothesis to explain our
findings. To interpret the phenomena surrounding our findings,
we relied primarily on our own judgment. Within this framework,
we analyzed each transcription following three standardized steps:
(1) Obtained a feeling of the entire transcription through multiple
readings; (2) Identified meaning units and extracted the ones that
were relevant for the clinical reasoning process; and (3) Integrated
different meaning units into emerging themes that were compared
against previous interviews [24]. This process was conducted after
each interview, and re-emerging themes were then tested in
subsequent interviews for their presence or absence. Physician’s
notes were used in the process of triangulation, therefore
confirming or rejecting some of our observations. Thereafter, we
explored the roles of these emerging themes in the clinical
reasoning process.
Transcriptions were coded line by line using a combination of
hand coding and the N6 software [25]. The senior author (RP)
initially coded each transcription, which was later checked and
discussed with two other independent researchers[DR, JS]. We did
not measure observer reliability and all disagreements were
resolved through consensus. Data saturation was defined whereby
consistent themes emerged across encounters, physicians and
different environments after successive interviews. This was
achieved by the time data from 16 physicians which included 20
patient appointments, 16 clinical discussions, and 10 personal
interviews, were collected.
Clinical Reasoning
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Emerging Themes
After analysis of the initial four transcriptions, we observed that
routine clinical appointments involved unchanging diagnostic or
therapeutic hypotheses. In contrast, complex clinical cases and
referrals required more elaborate reasoning and, subsequently
only complex cases were selected. Based on the analysis of these
cases. we found four related emerging themes that described the
clinical reasoning phenomena: 1. Simple and robust heuristics, 2.
Social environment rationality, 3. Attempts to prove hypothesis
and refute contradiction and 4. Saturation point. These emerging
themes can be interlinked in different manners at different phases
of the clinical reasoning process (Figure 1). Therefore, the
emerging themes and sequence will be described separately. All
emerging themes can be described and aggregated around (1) the
search for a hypothesis for diagnostic or therapeutic choice, and (2)
decreasing the amount of cognitive effort and time necessary to
reach the hypothesis. Each of the emerging themes will be
described in relation to these two factors. The characteristics of
participant physicians are displayed in Table 1. To facilitate the
interpretation of our study findings, a taxonomy was created which
is listed in List S1.
Simple and robust heuristics
Physicians always began with a series of exploratory questions
about past, personal, and family medical history, as well as current
symptoms. Although slight variations were found, questions
tended to be standardized within specialties. For example, while
pediatricians would always ask about conditions related to the
birth of the child, nephrologists had a series of standard questions
about the aspects of the urine. These questions were exploratory in
nature and tended not to focus on any specific hypothesis. Some
quotes on these exploratory questions are as follows: ‘‘Tell me
about diseases you had when you were a child’’, ‘‘What is the
reason you came here’’, and ‘‘Do you have any allergies?’’. When
asked about the reason for the general heuristic, physicians
repeatedly mentioned that a standard set of questions resulted in
consistent results and would also save cognitive energy. A
pediatrician mentioned: ‘‘Asking these questions gives me a
direction…allows me to find some clues on the diagnosis….Not
using them would increase the amount of work because I would
have to start with questions…that would probably not lead me
anywhere.’’ Physicians used these general questions as a way to
find one or more signs or symptoms that would trigger a simple
and robust heuristic, or a clue that would define a diagnosis and
subsequent treatment. This simple and robust heuristic was
applicable to a wide range of conditions while maintaining its
validity.
When this trigger was activated, physicians would stop
exploring and start on a fixed path looking for the confirmation
rather than falsification of a diagnosis and subsequent treatment
plan. Although a hypothesis could have a multitude of clinical
signs and/or symptoms attached to it, physicians believed that a
group of characteristics constituted a pattern representative of an
individual hypothesis. For example, a female pediatrician, 10 years
in practice was asked for an example of how she usually makes a
diagnosis said that ‘‘Well … we [referring to pediatricians in
general] usually already have in mind what is necessary and then
try to find exactly what we would expect.’’ Another example, while
abdominal pain alone was not found to be associated with a
diagnosis, a pediatrician mentioned that ‘‘pain in the lower right
quadrant, some fever… and this sign [shows the Bloomberg sign
(where she elicits pain through a maneuver of slow compression
and sudden decompression) at the McBurney’s point] would
suggest appendicitis.’’ At this point, the physician recognized the
pattern, stopped using general heuristics and focused on
hypothesis-specific heuristics. When asked about the reason for
the focus, physicians mentioned that they were already confident
about the hypothesis and that further investigation would lead to a
waste of time. From this point on, physicians looked for cues that
would confirm the hypothesis. This search continued until the
saturation point was reached.
Social environment rationality
Social environment rationality was used during the whole
reasoning process and was represented in two principal ways. First,
during the general heuristics phase, physicians commonly relied on
information from the social environment. These environmental
sources included referral letters and previous information from
medical charts, comments from assistant physicians, or clinical
discussions with other physicians. During personal interviews,
physicians reported this kind of information as ‘‘concentrated or
distilled’’. According to a nephrologist, ‘‘you can gather a lot of
information by talking to the family [member]’’; while an
interventional cardiologist felt that ‘‘letters from the family
practitioner will frequently provide the additional information
we need… to reach a diagnosis… in association with our
examination findings.’’
Second, information from the social environment helped the
physician to determine the level of complexity to be used in his
chosen heuristics. When the information from the social
environment pointed to a routine case (something seen by the
physician several times a week), simple specific-hypothesis
heuristics were selected. In contrast, environmental information
that pointed to a complex case (a case that was diagnosed only few
times a year) involving multiple previous attempts of diagnosis or
therapeutics, or a patient that was referred by a colleague,
physicians applied more complex and exhaustive heuristics. For
example, a male pediatric cardiologist, 10 years in practice
received a patient referred by a general pediatrician with a
diagnostic hypothesis of a congenital cardiac anomaly. Although
history and physical examination were normal, he continued the
investigation with additional exams. He said ‘‘You see, the exam is
apparently normal, with nothing that calls my attention… but we
need to continue the investigation now with an EKG and
echocardiogram to evaluate the heart of the baby.’’
Environmental information pointing to a higher degree of
complexity also resulted in hypothesis-specific heuristics that led
physicians to suspend judgment in a greater number of cases. In
such cases, final clinical decisions were confirmed only after
additional exams were obtained and/or further discussions with
peers. In other words, perceived complexity obtained from social
environment led to a cautionary attitude in decision making.
According to an interventional cardiologist, ‘‘When we start with a
complex story from a referring physician… that we know is a good
doctor… we should take extra care to make our diagnosis since
there might be a lot of factors going on.’’
Attempts to prove hypothesis and refute contradiction
Once an initial pattern was recognized and a hypothesis
established, physicians moved from a general heuristic to a
hypothesis-specific heuristic with a positive test strategy. Unlike
researchers who use a statistical hypothesis testing strategy that
aims to refute an initial hypothesis, physicians use a strategy
focused on confirming their initial hypothesis. Although contra-
dictory to the perceived image of a clinician always looking for
differential diagnosis, this heuristic seems to provide an econom-
Clinical Reasoning
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would be cumbersome for physicians to constantly doubt their
own initial hypotheses in search of alternative diagnoses or
therapeutic approaches. According to a pediatrician ‘‘we would
not be able to finish our clinic if we [were to] think about
differential diagnosis all day… and this works [referring to the
method of not thinking about differential diagnosis all day].’’
When information contradicting the initial hypothesis emerged,
its sources were always the patient or the physician’s peers, not the
physician himself. The physician would first attempt to prove the
initial hypothesis by refuting the contradicting information rather
than immediately moving to an alternative hypothesis. For
example a male interventional cardiologist, 10 years in practice,
when asked by the researcher about his attitudes when the
symptoms referred by a patient do no match a diagnosis said: ‘‘…
what one does is to explore the symptoms to check if what he
[referring to the patient] reports as his symptoms is or is
not something … many times what is really dear for us is not
[for him] … sometimes he may say that he is short of breath, but is
really not dyspnea.’’ Another example is, a male cardiac surgeon
with 15 years in practice, that during an appointment with a low
educational status patient who referred ‘‘cramps’’ in his legs
disregarded the patient’s complaints since they were not in
agreement with his hypothesis. Only, when physicians could not
refute the contradicting information, would they begin to explore
alternative hypotheses and use more complex heuristics. Contra-
dicting information was most prevalent in complex cases which
were discussed with peers. At that time, these peers raised
contradictions and sometimes alternative hypotheses (i.e., differ-
ential diagnosis) that enhanced the quality of the final diagnosis.
Contradictions raised by peers presented a greater weight and
were harder to refute than contradictions raised by the patient. It
should be emphasized that peers were consulted only for difficult
cases, which again points to a parsimony and attempt to save
cognitive energy while handling the clinical reasoning process.
Simple cases are handled by a simple hypothesis-specific heuristic
that can only be contradicted by patient information, whereas
complex cases could be contradicted by both patients and peers. In
summary, different case complexities required heuristics with a
different level of exposure to contradiction.
Saturation point
Once a hypothesis was established and either the hypothesis-
specific heuristic had no apparent contradiction or all contradic-
tions had been refuted, the physician went to a saturation point
where the case was deemed to be resolved. This saturation point
Figure 1. Pathway for clinical reasoning process.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010265.g001
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contradictions, but below, we point out two common factors that
could delay its reach although all contradictions were resolved.
First, the presence of multiple contradictions tended to reduce
physician’s confidence and, as such, increased their threshold for
saturation. In other words, if while evaluating a patient, the
physician had several points that initially ‘‘didn’t seem right’’
(according to a cardiac surgeon), but that were later refuted to
confirm the hypothesis, the hypothesis was weakened and its
acceptance was delayed. It was unclear why this occurred, but
apparently the physician’s confidence in the overall information
provided by the patient or laboratory exams decreased substan-
tially in spite of successful attempts to refute all contradictions.
When asked why this occurred, a pediatrician said that ‘‘even
though there is nothing against my diagnosis, there were just too
many ‘almost wrong’ things… going on…I just don’t feel good
about this diagnosis.’’
Second, social environmental factors such as the opinion of
peers seemed to play a crucial role in the determination of a
threshold for acceptance of a hypothesis. Since contradictions
raised by peers seemed to have a greater weight than those raised
by patients, finding contradiction among peers even though the
clinician successfully refuted them, frequently led to a suspension
of the final decision. In these circumstances, a saturation point was
reached without a diagnosis and the heuristic was postponed while
waiting for further information in the form of additional exams,
additional peer opinion, or simply for the appearance of new
evidence as the disease progressed.
Discussion
We found that clinicians frequently use simple heuristics in the
process of clinical decision making. In this discussion, we will argue
that these simple heuristics are in contrast with the way criteria are
defined in diagnostic clinical practice guidelines (DCPGs). Simple
heuristics were divided into general and hypothesis-specific
heuristics. Questions based on general heuristics were exploratory
and were used to save time and effort in the process. Use of these
heuristics led to the discovery of cues that guided the formulation
of a hypothesis. At this point, hypothesis-specific heuristics were
employed until a saturation point was reached. Social environ-
ment rationality represented another way of decreasing the
amount of cognitive energy used in the search of a hypothesis
and, afterwards, in its confirmation. This approach helped
physicians define a diagnosis and determine a saturation point,
sometimes being the most important factor in delaying the final
diagnosis.
When trying to make diagnostic or therapeutic decisions,
physicians based their clinical reasoning on simple and robust
heuristics rather than relying on a powerful memory to remember
lists from diagnostic criteria that are typical from DCPGs. Our
findings are in accordance with the theory of bounded rationality
which provides plausible explanations for physician’s ability to
make intelligent choices quickly, in an economic manner related to
cognitive energy, and with minimum necessary information by
exploiting the way information is structured in their environment
[9]. Aided by information obtained from the environment,
bounded rationality proposes that simple heuristics perform
comparably or even outperform more complex algorithms,
particularly when generalizing to more complex cases [26].
We observed the use of ‘‘simple’’ heuristics instead of rule based
decision trees (the ones usually stated in DCPGs). Besides being
simple, these heuristics were also ‘‘robust’’ since they could be
applied to a wide range of clinical situations. In other words,
simplicity leads to robustness. The notion of bounded rationality
also promotes a vision of clinical reasoning based on three
premises. First, it assumes that due to time, knowledge, and
memory constrains, physicians base their clinical decisions on
simple heuristics that are at the same time robust and precise.
Second, it offers solutions that are domain-specific rather than
general. Bounded rationality provides heuristics that are composed
of cognitive and environmental models that can be a part of
multiple heuristics and can allow for the composition of new
heuristics. Third, the success of the bounded rationality strategies
is related to its degree of adaptation to the structure of
environments, both physical and social [9,27]. The adaptation
and selection of strategies from a broad repertoire is based on a
cost-benefit approach which states, the less cognitive effort the
better [21]. Therefore, our findings disagree with previous studies
in which clinical reasoning has been considered to be unbounded,
or unlimited by constraints such as time and ability to process a
massive set of information [19,28]. This shows a contrast in the
way decisions are taken in the real world and the way DCPGs are
presented to guide decisions. While real life follows simple
strategies, DCPGs can be complex leading to lower compliance
and adherence [13]. For example, they involve decision trees that
may deter clinicians from adopting and adhering to them in real
life scenarios [13]. A better approach to clinical decision making
could involve its marriage with an electronic medical record where
a multitude of guidelines would be compared with a patient’s
condition and treatment strategy. In such a case, real time analysis
of patient data against the recommendations of a guideline would
be presented in a simple graphical format that would facilitate a
clinician’s decision making process. Such a tool would make
guidelines more user-friendly while better reflecting real life
scenarios [29].
Information gathered from the environment (social environ-
ment rationality) was represented in our study as comments from
other physicians, referral letters and medical charts. This
environment-based information was important in defining not
Table 1. Characteristics of participating physicians (gender
and specialization X years of practice).
1–10 years 10–20 years .20 years
n%N %n %
Female
Cardiologist
1 6,25
Female
Pediatrician
2 12,5 1 6,25
Female
Intensivist
1 6,25
Male Cardiac
Surgeon
2 12,5 1 6,25
Male
Cardiologist
1 6,25
Male Pediatric
Cardiologist
1 6,25
Male
Interventional
Cardiologist
2 12,5 1 6,25
Male
Pneumologist
1 6,25
Male
Nephrologist
2 12,5
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010265.t001
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point. While receiving this information, clinicians looked for high
validity cues. Although the strategy of ‘searching cues from the
environment’ is important, in some instances, too much
information can come from it leading to computational needs
beyond human capabilities. Furthermore, it has been previously
noted that there is a risk of making errors when thinking that a
particular patient is fundamentally different from the other, similar
patients [9]. Some EBM advocates also postulate that the use of
the environmental data is misleading [30]. We agree that
environmental factors and cues are limited by the ability of the
observer to register, understand and incorporate them in clinical
decision making. However, when utilized correctly and judicious-
ly, they can contribute to better decisions at a lesser cost.
[17,31,32]. Although, some environmental factors maybe included
in DCPGs, inclusion of all the factors poses a limitation. Efforts
should be directed at understanding certain common and general
aspects of influence of environment, such as referrals, charts and
notes. The incorporation of the most common aspects gathered
from the environment in DCPGs would allow for shortcuts, where
some steps could be skipped without the risk of losing accuracy.
During the use of hypothesis-specific heuristics, clinicians
directed their efforts toward a diagnosis that confirmed their
hypothesis and refuted all possible contradictions. This finding is
in contrast with the classical idea of clinicians frequently
attempting to refute their initial diagnosis through differential
diagnoses [33], or clinicians trying to rule out potentially serious
diagnosis [34]. Some of the work in this area acknowledges these
findings as confirmation bias and suggest that directing data
collection to the confirmation of hypothesis can lead to sustaining
an inappropriate, and most of the time, premature hypothesis,
neglecting important alternative data [9,21,33]. On the other
hand, there are authors who encourage the use of a positive test
strategy (i.e. focused on confirming rather than rejecting the
hypothesis) since the replication of cases consistent with the
hypothesis tested have a good chance of achieving the expected
result [33]. Our findings were consistent with the later view, since
while clinicians do not look for a contradiction themselves, their
action, when one is pointed out by the patient or environment, is
to try to refute it, sustaining their initial hypothesis. This seems to
be related to the additional effort that would be necessary to re-
start the process of looking for another hypothesis. This
phenomenon again points to bounded rationality which looks for
satisfying and not optimizing the costs of giving up of a hypothesis
without trying to sustain it, as this search could exceed the benefits
[35]. If the same process is compared with the DCPGs for final
diagnostic or therapeutic conclusions, DCPGs would list several
elimination steps for differential diagnosis. This would make the
whole process cumbersome and cost driven, not only for the
physician but also for the patient. The reason for this complexity
lies in the nature of the DCPGs, which are disease specific and not
patient specific. A clinician may encounter different types of
patients with different and sometimes even multiple diseases in the
clinic [36]. Thus, a physician’s judgment is based on several other
factors pertinent to that specific patient and environment and not
only the ones suggested by DCPGs. The DCPGs could rarely
provide recommendations on these aspects. Following any disease
specific guidelines can always put the physician in dilemma about
reaching a conclusion for confirming the hypothesis about the
diagnosis. In the given scenario, physician’s tacit knowledge and
contradictions put forth by the environment and by the patient are
also important.
‘Saturation point’ was defined as the moment when physicians
decide to stop using heuristics. It could be reached either because
physicians confirmed a hypothesis or because they halted the
process until further discussion was held with peers or they could
wait for further evolution of their patients’ condition. This method
of limiting and stopping the search as soon as they felt satisfied
with the decision is part of Simon & Seltens models of bounded
rationality [37,38]. As soon as the physician using hypothesis-
specific heuristics with a positive test strategy found a pattern, the
process was stopped and a diagnosis was reached. This process
could be delayed when there were many cues to the diagnosis that
needed to be refuted. The effort to refute cues lead to a reduction
in physician’s confidence and a rise in uncertainty levels.
Contradictions from the environment, particularly contradicting
peer opinion led to the same result. Confidence in own judgment is
also found to be an important factor in decision making whereby
employing heuristics [39,40]. In our study, confidence was a chief
factor for establishing the saturation point, but it certainly was not
the only component. For instance, time pressure, although not
observed in this study, must be taken into account, and further
study should be conducted in this area [35]. DCPGs should try to
limit multiple steps in order to reach a conclusion. This should
happen with prior, active involvement of physicians’ right at the
developmental stage of the DCPGs. A probable solution may be
obtaining consensus of the physicians and giving attention to the
adoption of the guidelines right at the time of DCPG development
process.
The use of a convenience sampling method and presence of
researchers during the process of clinical decision making might
have an impact on our findings and thus represent a limitation of
our study. Yet another limitation was the difficulty to follow-up all
physician encounters with colleagues, since these encounters
occurred by chance, without a previous schedule and although
the researcher attempted to attend all meetings there were
occasions when this was not possible. In certain cases, presence
of a nurse might have had an effect on the course and content of
discussion. However, this was not taken into account in the current
study. The study represents the decision making process utilized by
a small sample of the clinician population. Our results are not
generalizable but serve the purpose of understanding and
evaluating the real world scenario.
DCPGs are primarily based on differential diagnosis which
involves a stepwise elimination of multiple hypotheses following an
evidence based strategy. Thus, in order to attain saturation and
reach a conclusion following the DCPGs, cost and time for
decision making must be affordable. Although, DCPGs as
standard of practice are important, they should constitute as bare
minimum requirements as possible, thus ensuring adherence.
Alternatively, backward design can be used in structuring DCPGs
wherein the diagnosis may start with the most relevant and
possible options which can then be either confirmed or refuted. As
a next step, subsequent diagnostic test interventions can be listed in
the order of decreasing possibilities.
We believe that the current DCPGs do not follow a backward
design approach, probably because they need to reflect a standard
approach that can be utilized in routine clinical practice. In
routine clinical practice, each patient could present with several
signs and symptoms along with co-morbid conditions and ongoing
medications. DCPGs can not encompass all this information as it
would make them complex. They have to be standard following a
bottom up approach. In such cases, heuristics, based on different
permutations and combination of available signs, symptoms and
other data, guide the clinician to arrive at a hypothesis, get views
from peers, try to refute the ones not aligning, order a diagnostic
test and get the hypothesis confirmed. Another important point is
that foolproof diagnostic methods with high sensitivity and
Clinical Reasoning
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ordering diagnostic tests, it is not sure that they will lead to
confirmation of diagnosis. For example, patient may have specific
symptoms pointing towards a diagnosis but the diagnostic test may
return a negative result. In such cases, heuristics supersede
guidelines. Additionally, backward design may not work in
DCPGs because they need to be simple and general enough so
that they can be used by clinicians with different sets of experience
including novice clinicians. For an inexperienced clinician, based
on the available information about a patient, it might be difficult to
start with the most relevant diagnosis as in case of backward design
approach followed in heuristics, rather they would prefer the
differential diagnosis as stated in the DCPGs.
Our study demonstrates that clinicians use a series of heuristics
following bounded rationality principles while not following a
stepwise method to make diagnostic decisions. The use of
heuristics was noted in our study to be highly intrinsic to the
decision making process and simply negating it will only move
DCPGs away from widespread implementation. Clinical reason-
ing cannot be interpreted as an autonomous set of rules, but as
bounded rationality that is highly influenced by its surrounding
environment. This finding not only has a say in the presentation of
the DCPGs, but has a direct impact on evidence based education
for future physicians. Nevertheless, to get this to a level of
incorporation into DCPGs, further studies are needed to confirm,
the generalizability as well as the impact on the outcome of
patients when one uses heuristics as opposed to just guidelines.
Assuming that physicians rely on bounded rationality, different
methods can ease out the process. Research efforts to develop
algorithms that integrate formal research knowledge with tacit
knowledge should be developed allowing clinicians to keep using
heuristics on a patient basis. Future research should focus on
strategies to reduce the most common heuristics biases without
creating cognitive overload. For example, a recent study showed
the use of visuals generated from real time electronic health record
data in facilitating the clinical decision making process [29].
Thus, an electronic health record system that provides a real
time data analysis of the previously treated patients, in terms of
their outcomes could assist in making heuristic decisions which
also have their roots in past experiences. Such assistance could
help in overcoming the subjective bias, a component of heuristics
judgment, while also helping the clinician make use of real time
evidence of their own data. Although while using these
computational assistants, physicians need to derive initial hypoth-
esis and to use their reasoning to input appropriate data [41].
Incorporation of such tools in real practice, as well as in the
medical curriculum, will help in streamlining the process of
heuristics in clinical practice.
Although we understand the limitations of the complex yet
comprehensive guideline structure that proposes to include
heuristics, we believe this new guideline structure would be
received with lot of interest and would also find more usage than
the current concept. The way of communicating DCPGs should
be based on extended cognition [42] mechanisms that are
compliant with our cognitive characteristics and needs rather
than (wrongly) supposing that people have an unlimited amount of
cognitive ability. Merging heuristics with its biases to the
generalization of DCPGs is an urging issue in medical decision
making.
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